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Abstract
Power grid outages cause huge economical and societal costs. Disruptions
in the power distribution grid are responsible for a significant fraction of electric
power unavailability to customers. The impact of extreme weather conditions,
continuously increasing demand, and the over-ageing of assets in the grid, deteri-
orates the safety of electric power delivery in the near future. It is this dependence
on electric power that necessitates further research in the power distribution grid
security assessment. Thus measures to analyse the robustness characteristics and
to identify vulnerabilities as they exist in the grid are of utmost importance. This
research investigates exactly those concepts- the vulnerability and robustness of
power distribution grids from a topological point of view, and proposes a metric
to quantify them with respect to assets in a distribution grid. Real-world data is
used to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed metric as a tool to assess the
criticality of assets in a distribution grid.
Keywords— Power Distribution Grid, Topological Robustness, Structural Vulnera-
bility, Metric, Complex Networks
1 Introduction
Among other critical infrastructures, the electric power grid plays a crucial role for the
daily life in modern societies. This is not only because of the importance of electric
power in the daily life, but also because of the dependency of other critical infrastruc-
tures on electric power [43]. The continuous availability of electric power is of key
importance for daily chores. Careful and diligent operations at the grid level ensure the
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transmission and distribution of electrical power with the highest possible reliability.
Yet, electric power delivery disruptions do occur, causing huge economical and soci-
etal cost [11, 21]. The analysis of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
data on power outages (of 100 MW or more) between 1991 and 2005 reveals that the
increase in the number of outages in the North America has been increasing exponen-
tially [2]. Also, disruptions in the electric distribution grid are responsible for 80% to
95% of customer electricity unavailability [32].
Power distribution grids are complex systems delivering electric power to millions
of customers. In a typical distribution area, electric power is distributed as a result of
the interaction of thousands of components, some of which are electrical assets (e.g.
transformers, cables, switches), and others being physical assets (e.g. poles, insulators)
which help support this propagation. In contrast to transmission grids that have a mesh
structure, distribution grid networks have a radial structure, implying a minimum level
of redundancy in the network structure. This minimum redundancy makes distribution
networks more vulnerable to disturbances and external forces, calling for a complete
power system security assessment of the distribution grids from various perspectives.
The vulnerability analysis of power grids can be classified as the conventional vul-
nerability analysis and the structural vulnerability analysis [8]. The conventional vul-
nerability analysis requires complete operational and topological data as well as the
engineering models in power systems. Yet, the boosting complexity of the determi-
nation of operational and topological states due to the increasing size of large-scale
power grids challenges the conventional vulnerability analysis [36] of these systems.
On the other hand, the strong relationship between the topology and physical behaviour
of power systems makes the structural vulnerability analysis a promising alternative.
The structural vulnerability analysis is a complementary tool to the conventional vul-
nerability analysis rather than substitutionary. Moreover, the structural vulnerability
analysis is also useful to understand the global properties of power grids affecting their
local behaviours [8].
The difference in the structure of power transmission and distribution grids affects
the process in which failure propagates across the different layers of the grid. On the
transmission side, the loss of one single component does not result in topological dis-
connection. However, it might trigger a cascade of successive failures in the form of
line overloads based on capacity constraints, voltage and frequency level instabilities,
and hidden failures in the protection devices, resulting in the eventual disconnection
and impairment of the grid. Consequently, analysing the vulnerability of a transmis-
sion grid also requires the incorporation of the impact of power flow into account, thus
suggesting that considering a purely topological approach would result in an incom-
plete analysis [25, 26]. On the other hand, in the case of the distribution grid, because
of its typical radial-like structure, the loss of one single component might potentially
result in topological disconnection of a certain geographical region of the distribution
grid. Due to the strong dependence of the distribution grid robustness to the underlying
topology, the assessment of the distribution grid robustness from a topological point of
view is a promising approach to gain additional insight into the system intrinsics and
behaviour.
Assessing power system vulnerabilities from a topological point of view requires
a system level approach to capture the topological interdependencies in the system.
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Recent advances in the field of network science [3, 10, 22, 46] reveal the promising
potential of complex networks theory to investigate power grids vulnerability at a sys-
tem level. Accordingly, this paper models an electrical power distribution grid as a
(directed) graph in which the nodes represent the electrical and physical assets in the
system, while edges model the logical information about connections between these
assets.
Power system security assessment investigates the ability of a system to provide
service under unexpected operating conditions (e.g. contingencies). The power sys-
tem vulnerability indicates the sensitivity to threats (i.e. malicious attacks) and distur-
bances (e.g. random failures) that possibly limit the ability of the system to provide
the intended services [27]. As opposed to vulnerability, robustness refers to the ability
of a system to perform the intended task under unforeseen disturbances. This paper
focusses on the robustness of an asset with respect to supply availability, and relates
it to the ability of an asset to be connected to sources (for supply availability) from a
topological point of view.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of exist-
ing work on power system vulnerability assessment, and positions this work. Section 3
qualitatively discusses the difference between the traditional system safety concept re-
dundancy and robustness. Section 4 introduces the proposed metric Upstream Robust-
ness. Section 5 applies the proposed metric on real-world use cases to demonstrate its
applicability for asset criticality assessment, while Section 6 provides a conclusion and
a discussion on future work.
2 Structural Vulnerability Analysis of Power Distribu-
tion Grids
Electrical power distribution security is an active field of research. The importance
of the electrical power in daily life attracts many researchers to analyse the safety of
electrical power delivery from various angles. Most of the existing efforts assesses
grid safety from a reliability engineering perspective [12, 13, 18, 23, 47]: researchers
perform a quantitative analysis to estimate the system reliability performance based
on component reliability values. The result of the analysis are the reliability indices
indicating the ability of the system to deliver power to the load points. The reliability
indices can be defined for individual load points, or for the overall system. Different
approaches can be used to compute the reliability of a system including Reliability
block diagrams, Markov methods, Petri nets and Monte Carlo Simulations [33].
One important subject in power system vulnerability analysis is to identify the crit-
ical components in a power system [16, 19, 20, 37, 38, 40]. The reliability indices (as
a result of a reliability analysis) do provide reliability performances of the individual
components, or overall system, however, they do not quantify the contribution of each
component to the system reliability (i.e. criticality). To determine the criticality of a
component, e.g. a sensitivity analysis is performed to relate the system reliability per-
formance to the reliability performance of individual components [5, 19]. In such an
analysis, a component is critical for a system if a small change in the reliability of the
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component results in a comparatively large change in system reliability [40].
This approach from the reliability perspective provides a detailed and useful anal-
ysis on system reliability, accounting for important aspects such as age, condition, and
individual failure probabilities of the assets. However, it does not provide any explicit
insight in the topological vulnerabilities of the components in the system. Moreover, it
encounters various challenges including complexity of the computational methods and
collecting accurate reliability data such as information on the material, age, and failure
history of the asset which are not always available to the grid security analysts [39].
One complementary way to assess power system safety is structural robustness (or
vulnerability) analysis, that is mainly performed from a Complex Networks Theory
perspective. In such an analysis, a system is modelled as a graph, and metrics and con-
cepts from Complex Networks Theory are deployed to statistically analyse topological
characteristics of these modelled systems [30]. In this way, the topology of a system is
related to the (operational) performance of the system, so that the operation and design
of these systems can be adjusted for a higher performance of the system.
Researchers assess networked systems from a topological perspective in various
fields including data communication networks [42], water management systems [48],
and transportation systems [17], and electrical power systems [41, 35, 7, 24, 27, 34, 21].
Some of these studies on power grids [31, 14, 45] statistically investigate the topologi-
cal properties of a power grid (such as degree distribution of clustering coefficient [44])
to relate its topology to the existing network models (e.g. small-world [46], or scale-
free [3]). A significant part of these studies on Complex Network Analysis of power
grids [41, 35, 9, 24, 4] investigate the relationship between the topology and the perfor-
mance of the system. Relying on these analysis, to quantify and exploit this relation-
ship between topology and performance, various metrics are designed/proposed. These
metrics can be used for various purposes including vulnerability analysis of compo-
nents (or of overall system), network design purposes, and critical component identifi-
cation. Some of these studies propose extended topological metrics that reflect the elec-
trical properties of the power grid [7, 21, 24, 27], while most of them [15, 1, 35, 29, 41]
characterize the power grids in terms of classical topological metrics, such as Between-
ness Centrality [44].
Whereas most of the existing work on analysing power systems from a topology
point of view focus on high-voltage power transmission grids, recent studies analyse
the structure of medium-, and low-voltage power distribution systems [30, 31]. Negeri
et al. [30] investigate the impact of topology of a distribution grid on its operational
performance, while Pagani et al. [31] asses the influence of the topological structure of
a distribution grid on the cost of decentralized power trading. Despite these studies that
statistically assess the power distribution grid topology, to the best of our knowledge,
there has been no attempt on designing measures to quantitatively assess the robustness
of an electrical distribution grids from a topological point of view.
The contribution of a component to the overall system security is determined by (i)
the reliability performance (affected by say the type of the materials, ambient condi-
tions, and age of the asset) and (ii) the connectivity (position relating to the topology)
of the asset. Accordingly, a complete security assessment of an electric power distri-
bution grid requires analysing both of the factors separately to assist the grid security
analysts to identify the vulnerabilities and the asset managers to determine the critical-
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ity of assets in the system. As complementary to the probabilistic approach from the
reliability point of view, this paper focuses on the assessment of the power system se-
curity from a topological point of view, and proposes a metric, Upstream Robustness,
to quantify the robustness of an asset with respect to supply availability in a electric
power distribution grid.
3 Redundancy vs. Robusness
The robustness of power distribution grids heavily depends on the topology of the grid,
mainly because of the minimum level of the redundancy in the system. Due to this lack
of topological redundancy, unlike in the power transmission grid, the loss of a single
component can potentially result in topological disconnection of a sizable part of the
grid from the sources and thus the disruption of the power delivery to the corresponding
part of the grid.
Therefore, measuring and managing redundancy in power distribution networks is
of key importance. The redundancy of a component in a distribution grid is tradition-
ally measured in terms of the number of alternative paths to that component from the
sources. This number of alternative paths represents the number of different ways to
reach an asset (and ultimately customers). The presence of multiple alternative paths
(characterized by redundancy) implies a more robust asset since even in case of a fail-
ure of one path due to loss of a single component along the path, the asset is still
supplied power through other alternative paths, preventing it from being single sourced
and vulnerable to single point failures in the system.
However, the existence of multiple alternative paths to an asset does not necessarily
protect it from being affected by single point failures. This is especially the case when
such alternative paths have common components between them. Even though multiple
paths exist between the asset and source(s), the failure of a common component still
disconnects the asset from the sources. Hence, as much as the redundancy (i.e. the
number of paths), the quality of this redundancy with respect to the exact configura-
tion and involved components, also has a crucial role in determining the robustness
of the asset with respect to supply availability. The number of alternative paths to an
asset evaluates the redundancy of the asset to receive electric power and the level of
disjointness and the length of these paths determine the quality of this redundancy.
Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship between the robustness and the redundancy along
with its quality. In the first topology in Fig. 1.a, only one path exists between the
target node t and the source s. The target node is not redundant, and any failure of the
components in the upstream results in disconnection of node t from the source. In the
second and third topology, two alternative paths exist between the target node t and the
source node s. These paths are partially disjoint in the second topology, while they are
completely disjoint in the last topology. As a result of two completely disjoint paths,
in the second topology, all of the components are backed up and no single component
failure causes disconnection of t from the source s, as opposed to the second topology
in which the single failure of node c2 results in the disconnection of t from s across
both available paths.
In addition to the disjointness of alternative paths, the length of these paths (in terms
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Figure 1: Robustness versus redundancy
of number of the assets in these paths) is another aspect contributing to the quality of
the redundancy in a power distribution grid. Each additional component in a path
introduces additional uncertainty and vulnerability by increasing the number of the
components on which t depends to be connected to the sources in the system.
To quantify the robustness of an asset, the Upstream Robustness captures the re-
dundancy of the network along with its quality by accounting for (i) the number of
alternative paths (from sources) to the asset, and (ii) the disjointness and (iii) the length
of these alternative paths.
4 Metric: Upstream Robustness
The proposed metric Upstream RobustnessRups relies on two main concepts; the inter-
path independency and intra-path independency. This section introduces these con-
cepts, explains the computational methodology, and elaborates on how these concepts
are combined to quantify the upstream robustness of a given asset.
4.1 Inter-path independency
The Upstream Robustness of an asset t is a weighted sum of the inter-path indepen-
dency values of all possible paths to t. The inter-path independency PIintert,i of a path
i quantifies the independency of the path i with respect to the other alternative paths to
t.
In this work, the independency of a path with respect to the neighbouring paths
corresponds to the disjointness between these paths. Given a set of alternative paths
Pt = {Pt,1, Pt,2, ..., Pt,m} to t that is obtained by e.g. a Breadth-First Search algo-
rithm [28], quantifying the disjointness of these paths requires capturing the impact
of (i) the number of common components between these alternative paths, and (ii) the
length of these paths to determine the fraction of the common components within a
path.
Fig. 2 shows three conceptual topologies for an intiutive discussion on the impact
of the number of common components, and the length of a path on the disjointness.
In all topologies, a target asset t is connected to a single source s through different
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Figure 2: Inter-path Independency conceptual explanation
configurations. In all the topologies, two different alternative paths exist between s and
t; e.g. for Fig. 2.a, Pt,1 = {c1, c2, c3} and Pt,2 = {c2, c3}.
In Fig. 2.b, Pt,1 and Pt,2 have higher disjointness levels compared to Pt,1 and Pt,2
in Fig. 2.a, because in Fig. 2.b, Pt,1 and Pt,2 have fewer components in common (1
component compared of 2). Additionally, in Fig. 2.c, the length of Pt,2 increases while
the number of common components with Pt,1 remains the same; hence the fraction
of the common components within Pt,2 decreases. As a result of this decrease, the
disjointness of Pt,2 in Fig. 2.c increases compared to the disjointness of Pt,2 in Fig. 2.b.
For a set of alternative paths Pt between the source(s) and a target node t, the
computational methodology for the inter-path independancy PIintert,i of a path i to an
asset t requires determining the Universe of the components between the source(s) and
the asset t, evaluating the frequency of the occurrence of each asset in these alternative
paths, and relying on this frequency value, computing the score of each component in
the universe. The normalized summation of scores of assets in a path results in the
inter-path independancy of the path.
The collection of the components in the alternative paths between the source(s) and
t comprise the universe Ut of the components. Ut is the union of all alternative paths
in Pt.
Ut = {Pt,1 ∪ Pt,2∪, ...,∪, Pt,m}
The frequency fc of a component c in Ut is determined by evaluating the number
of occurrence of c in all alternative paths in Pt. The total number of occurrence of c in
these paths gives the frequency of occurrence fc of c.
fc =
{
fc + 1 if c ∈ Pt,i
fc if c 6∈ Pt,i
The score sc of c defines how much the component belongs to a path and it is
computed as the inverse of the frequency fc:
sc =
1
fc
(1)
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For a completely disjoint path, all of its components belong to the path completely;
each component has a score of one. The score of a component decreases as it is shared
between multiple alternative paths.
PIintert,i of a path Pt,i is determined by summing up the score of each component
in Pt,i, and normalizing it with the summation of the maximum possible scores of the
components in Pt,i. The summation of the component scores is maximized for the
case all the components have frequency and score of 1, i.e. when a path is completely
disjoint. In that case, the summation of the scores equals the number of the components
in Pt,i.
PIintert,i =
1
Lt,i
∑
i∈Pt,i
si (2)
where Lt,i is the the number of the assets in the path Pt,i, and computed as the
cardinality of Pt,i:
Lt,i = |Pt,i| (3)
PIintert,i quantifies how disjoint the paths are to each other in Pt. The maximum
value of PIinter of a path is one, for a completely disjoint path. PIinter of a path
decreases as more and more components are shared with other neighbouring paths.
4.2 Intra-path independency
The intra-path independency PIintrat,i of a path Pt,i to an asset t is an asset-specific
metric relating to the number of assets in Pt,i that have to be functioning for t receiv-
ing supply from the dedicated source s. Each additional asset in a path between t and
s increases the dependency of t on other assets to reach s, accordingly decreasing the
robustness of t with respect to the supply availability. Hence, the number of the com-
ponents in a path to a given asset is inversely proportional to the robustness of the given
asset to be connected to the source s. The intra-path independency conceptualizes this
effect of additional components in a path on the robustness with respect to supply avail-
ability. Quantifying the impact of the number of the components in a path Pt,i requires
first determining the length Lt,i (see Eq. 3) of the path in terms of number of the com-
ponents in the path excluding the source and target nodes. Intra-path independency
PIintrat,i of the path Pt,i is a function of the length of the path Pt,i.
PIintrat,i =
1
Lt,i + 1
(4)
In the denominator in Eq. 4, the +1 expression accounts for the effect of the failure of
the target node itself. In other words, for a target node t to function as expected, all of
the components in its path from the source s along with itself need to not fail and work
as expected.
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4.3 Upstream robustness
After computing the inter-path and intra-path independencies, two values are assigned
to each path. The product of these values for a path gives the individual contribution of
the path to the overall upstream robustness of the asset. Finally, the Upstream Robust-
ness of an asset t can be computed by aggregating the individual contributions of each
path to the overall robustness of t.
Rtups =
m∑
i=1
PIintert,i PI
intra
t,i (5)
where m stands for the number of paths from the source(s) to t.
5 Use Case: Asset Criticality Assessment
Together with the de-regulation of the electricity markets, distribution grid operators
face the challenging task of attaining the delicate balance between providing ade-
quate power reliably and its economical ramifications. The expectations from the cus-
tomers and government bodies on high supply availability enforces utility companies
to deploy effective methods to reduce their cost while maintaining good service lev-
els when it comes to delivering this power reliably across the network. Addressing
this dilemma requires assessing the criticality of components and prioritizing them for
effective decision-making on maintenance strategies and on investment plans. This
section demonstrates the ability of the Upstream Robustness Rups metric to determine
the criticality of assets in a power distribution grid and thus to aid with making effective
decisions.
In a criticality analysis relying on Rups, the criticality of an asset c relates to the
extent in which c contributes to the upstream robustness of the assets that are down-
stream of it (i.e. the assets that are connected to a source via asset c). Accordingly, the
criticality of an asset c is computed as the drop in the collective robustness of the other
assets in the system upon removal of c. A sensitivity analysis is performed to compute
the criticality Ccdown of a component c in a distribution grid/network G:
Ccdown =
RGups −RG`ups
RGups
(6)
where G` is the weakened system that is obtained by removing the asset c from the
original system G. The RGups is the Upstream Robustness of the original network G:
RGups =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Rciups (7)
where N corresponds to the number of the components which are load points of the
system, e.g. transformers that are potentially connected to customers, or batteries that
are used to store electric power in micro grids.
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Figure 3: Graph representation of a part of the real world power distribution grid sub-
station.
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Figure 4: Asset criticalities of the sub-network of the real world power distribution grid
substation. Blue line gives the result of criticality analysis byRups based on sensitivity
analysis (See Eq. 6), while the red line corresponds to the normalized Betweenness
Centrality values of assets. Normalized Betweenness values are obtained by normal-
izing all the Betweenness values of assets with the largest Betweenness value of the
assets (i.e. Betweenness value of asset with ID 50). This is done to map all the Be-
tweenness values in [0,1].
To demonstrate the applicability of Rups as a measure to assess the criticality of
the components, a sub-grid of an actual electrical power utility company’s distribution
grid is considered. Fig. 3 illustrates a hierarchical graph representation of the sub-grid.
In this graph, nodes correspond to the assets such as transformers and cables, while the
edges model the logical connections between these assets. The network consists of 91
assets comprised of electrical and physical assets, and supplied by one single source.
The criticality of assets in Fig. 3 are determined by a sensitivity analysis (See Eq. 6)
relying on Rups. At the same time, for comparison purposes, the criticality of assets
are also determined based on Betweenness Centrality. The Betweenness Centrality of
an asset c Bc relates to the number of shortest paths in the system that traverse the asset
c.
Bc =
∑
s,t∈N
σst(c)
σst
(8)
where σst(c) is the number of shortest paths passing through asset c, while σst is the
total number of shortest paths in the grid topology. A relatively larger Bc corresponds
a larger number of shortest paths through the asset c, implying a higher criticality of c
in the system. Therefore, the Betweenness Centrality is traditionally used to quantify
the criticality of components in complex networks, also applied on power grids [1,
15, 29]. Fig. 4 shows asset criticality values based on Upstream Robustness Rups and
Betweenness Centrality B (blue line for criticality based on Rups and red line for B),
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Table 1: The top 15 critical assets identified by Upstream Robustness Rups and Be-
tweenness Centrality B.
Asset ID Rups- based criticality (%) Asset ID B- based criticality (%)
62 100.00 50 100.00
80 88.05 85 95.60
91 79.87 34 92.31
85 76.11 71 87.91
82 37.82 61 78.75
61 35.95 84 75.09
84 35.50 82 64.47
34 34.36 91 64.46
71 33.51 17 61.54
50 31.92 5 58.42
17 17.10 16 52.75
6 16.60 6 51.28
5 16.03 18 42.86
16 13.42 7 36.26
18 10.59 4 32.97
while Tab. 1 gives the 15 most critical assets identified by these metrics.
Fig. 4 illustrates the similarity between the asset criticality values by the Rups-
based and B-based approach. In Fig. 4, most of the times, both metrics identify the
same assets as critical (e.g. assets with ID 34, 50, and 71), and non-critical (e.g. 54,
67, and 81). Also Tab. 1 shows the top 15 assets according toRups andB are mostly in
line: 13 of the 15 assets are common in these lists (although with different rankings).
However, in both Fig. 4 and Tab. 1, one big difference is obvious in criticality identifi-
cation of nodes with ID 62 and 80. The asset criticality analysis based on Rups show
that the asset with ID of 62 and 80 are the most critical assets for the robustness of the
system, while they are considered not critical by B. These results collectively show
that the two metrics capture similar properties of a topology to some extent, however
there are differences between them too.
The Betweenness Centrality is a topological measure that is widely used to as-
sess network characteristics in complex networks. Although a topological approach
is appropriate to assess the power distribution grid (See the discussion in Sec. 1),
purely topological generic metrics such as Betweenness Centrality fail to capture cer-
tain topological characteristics of power grids, mainly for two reasons [6]. First, the
Betweenness Centrality does not make any distinction in the type of buses in the sys-
tem. However, in power grids, each bus can be categorized depending on its function
as generation, transmission and load buses. The electric power is transmitted from the
generation buses to load points through intermediate (i.e. transmission) components.
The goal of a power grid is delivering electric power from the generation to the load
points. Therefore, only the paths between the generation and the load points matter,
rather than shortest paths between any pair of nodes. Second, B considers only the
shortest path between a pair of nodes, e.g. a source and a load point. However, ac-
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counting for all paths between these buses along with their quality (i.e. disjointness
and length of these paths) is of key importance to measure the robustness in the system
(See discussion in Sec. 3). The Upstream Robustness quantifies the redundancy in the
system along with its quality. These two main differences between Rups and B results
in different assessment of component criticality analysis in the system.
In Fig. 3, two sub-areas are visible, and these areas are fed by one single source (the
asset with ID 62). Accordingly, in Fig. 4 and in Tab. 1, Rups identifies the asset with
ID 62 as the most critical component in the system with a criticality value of 100%.
This is because this component is the only source supplying the network, and loss of
this component results in the loss of all other components in the system. However, B
quantifies the criticality of node with 62 as 0, since it does not distinguish between the
bus types, failing to capture the importance of a source in a power grid.
In Fig. 4, according to the analysis based on Rups, 27 assets have a criticality
of lower than 1 %. These components are "leaf" components, i.e. no downstream
components are attached to them (e.g. the component with the ID of 10 in Fig. 3).
Accordingly, the failure of these components does not negatively affect the supply
availability of any other components except for themselves. This is captured by the
criticality analysis based on Rups. Also B identifies these components as non-critical,
since these assets are topologically not central, i.e. no shortest paths traverse these
assets.
In the component criticality assessment based on Rups (See Tab. 1), the first 3
components (after the source node) are the assets that are in very close vicinity of the
source (assets with ID 80, 91, and 85) and their loss results in de-energizing of the
rest of the system. Consequently, Rups spot them as the most critical components after
the source component in the system. After that, gradually, as the components move
farther away from the source, the criticality of assets also drops, since the number of
the components that depend on them reduces as well. Visually, in Fig. 3, the loss of
any of the assets with ID 82, 61, or 34 disconnects all the assets in the left hand side
of Fig. 3, while the failure of any of the assets with ID 84, 71 or 50 disengages all the
assets in the right hand side of the Fig. 3. The criticality of these assets is captured by
the criticality analysis based on Rups, and these assets are identified as the top critical
assets in the system, verifying the effectiveness of criticality analysis intuitively.
To assess whether the proposed metric Rups is globally applicable and scalable,
a criticality analysis is a performed for a real-world substation region of the same
electrical power utility’s territory. Because of the sensitivity of such information, we
anonymized the asset IDs and will refer to this substation region as Substation A.
Substation A consists of 4713 assets that are fed by 6 different feeders (i.e. sources)
in the system. 1314 of these assets are transformers, while the rest are assets such as
cables, breakers, fuses, switches, reclosers and support structures (e.g. poles). The
entire Substation A is modelled as a graph, the network robustness value is determined
based on Eq. 7, and the criticality of each asset is assessed based on Eq. 6. Fig. 5 shows
the results.
Fig. 5 suggests the existence of a small subset of components in the system with
relatively high criticality, and a significant fraction of the components with much lower
(than 1%) importance to the system. These critical components are geographically
spread over the substation area, implying that not only the distance to the sources, but
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Figure 5: The criticality of the assets in the Substation A.
also the topological positions of these components matter in determining the criticality
of the assets in the system.
Fig. 5 shows that, as opposed to the criticality analysis in Fig. 4, sources in the
Substation A do not have 100% criticality for the system. The region covered by Sub-
station A is fed by multiple sources. Each source feeds a part of the network, and
some parts of the network are fed by multiple sources. Consequently, a loss of a single
source affects only that part of the network which isn’t redundant; the remainder of the
network can still be supported by the 5 other sources in the system.
Fig. 6 illustrates how the criticality of the assets in Substation A (See Fig. 5) is
distributed over all assets. In Substation A, only 31 out of nearly 5000 components
have a criticality larger than 25%, 39 more have a criticality that is larger than 20 %,
and in total 166 components with a criticality more than 10%. Hence, less than 2% of
all components have a criticality larger than 20%, and less than 4% of the components
in the system have a criticality more than 10%. On the other hand, more than 80% of
the assets in the system have a criticality of less than 1% suggesting that removal of
these components have a very minor impact on the robustness of other assets in the
system.
As in every complex system, including the power distribution grid, the relative im-
portance of the components in the system is highly skewed and non-uniform. A very
small subset of the components is significantly critical for the system, while a greater
portion of components have relatively small criticality values. In Fig. 5, the critical-
ity analysis based on the Upstream Robustness identifies these critical components in
Substation A effectively, showing the value of such metrics in assisting asset managers
for appropriate decision-making on investment plans.
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Figure 6: Asset criticality distribution in the Substation A. 86.19% of the assets in the
system have a criticality less than 1%, while only 0.66% of the assets have a criticality
of larger than 25%
6 Conclusion and Discussion
Utility companies typically assess the robustness of their network at different levels
of grid abstraction. The first method corresponds to a circuit level analysis where tra-
ditional reliability engineering techniques and concepts are focussed on. A circuit is
traced from its source and feeder in the substation towards downstream components.
While doing so, the condition of the involved assets are estimated and used as a proxy
for individual asset robustness and overall system reliability. A more topological driven
approach is employed when it comes to criticality assessment. The whole network is
divided into protective zone regions based on the presence of protective devices such
as fuses, reclosers and sectionalizers. The count of customers is aggregated in each of
these protective zones, and used as a KPI (Key Performance Indicator) to denote the
effective deployment of protective devices in the grid. Both these techniques fail to in
capture the presence of alternate paths of electrical distribution in the grid which is en-
abled by devices such as switches and open points. This combined with the knowledge
of path length and path disjointness results in a much more useful and accurate way of
computing network robustness, which has been the focus of our work.
This paper proposes the Upstream Robustness Rups to quantify the robustness of
an asset against disturbances to receive supply from the sources. The computation of
the upstream robustness of an asset c, Rcups, requires measuring the redundancy along
with the quality of the redundancy of the topology between the asset c and the source(s)
in the network. The Upstream Robustness achieves this by accounting for three main
aspects of the topology: (i) the number of alternative paths (from sources) to the asset,
(ii) the level of disjointness of these alternative paths, (iii) the number of the assets in
these alternative paths.
The alternative paths to an asset is determined by a Breadth First Search algorithm.
The disjointness of these alternative paths to each other is modelled by inter-path in-
dependency while the impact of the length of these paths on the assets robustness is
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captured by intra-path independency. Combining these (inter)dependencies, the Up-
stream Robustness of the asset is computed.
The proposed metric is used to assess the criticality of the assets in a given distri-
bution grid. Rups is applied on the real-world data of a distribution substation network
to investigate the criticality of the assets in the system. These results are compared
with the results from a traditional complex networks metric, Betweenness Centrality,
and the differences between two approach are discussed. Experimental results confirm
the effectiveness of the proposed metric Rups as a measure for asset criticality anal-
ysis to assist asset managers in appropriate decision-making regarding the investment
and maintenance planning of the grid. Yet, it should not be the only approach to con-
sider when making investment decisions to improve a grid. As is true with most power
distribution grid utilities, factors like customer priority (such as assets serving impor-
tant industrial customers or critical services like hospitals), regulatory requirements,
capacity constraints, health of individual assets, and economic benefits should also be
considered and given their due weightage. That said, because of the large number of
assets involved to make the system work, not only does this technique provide a new
lens to assess assets, but also a way to rank them when the other factors are equal.
This paper focuses on the robustness assessment of traditional power distribution
grids. Future work focusses on making the proposed metric applicable for the Smart
grid case. Accounting for the smart power distribution grids requires slight adjustments
to the proposed metric. For instance, the introduction of prosumer concept in smart
grids enables bidirectional flow rather than a unidirectional power flow as it is now in
a traditional power distribution grid. Incorporating the impact of bidirectional power
flow into the proposed approach requires determining all possible paths between an
asset and sources with the assumption of undirected graph modelling of the grid rather
than directed graph. The future work will focus on incorporating all such aspects so
that the metric can also be deployed to assess the robustness of smart grids. Addition-
ally, the proposed metric will also be applied on various relevant problems including
evaluation of the right locations for adding assets (such as cables, transformers, and
batteries) for future network expansion planning.
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